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Abstract:
Purpose: we prepared a questionnaire to evaluate Incompatible parts and also risk management
in University of  Science and Technology E-Learning Center and studying the Incompatible parts
impacts on utility of  organization.
Design/methodology/approach: By using coalitional game theory we present a new model to
recognize the degrees of  incompatibility among independent divisions of  an organization with
dependent security assets.  Based on positive and negative interdependencies in the parts,  the
model provides how the organization can decrease the security risks through non-cooperation
rather than cooperation. we implement the proposed model of  this paper by analyzing the data
which  have  been  provided  by  questionnaires  from  different  three  managers’  ideas  of  Iran
University of  Science and Technology E-Learning Center located in Iran University of  Science
and Technology, Tehran, Iran.
Findings: In general, by collecting data and analyzing them, the survey showed that Incompatible
parts of  organizations have negative impacts on utility of  organization risk management process.
Furthermore, it adds values to other organizations and provides the best practices in planning,
developing, implementing and monitoring risk management in organizations.
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Research limitations/implications: Since Information security and also Risk Management are
still areas which need to improve in some Iranian universities, we couldn’t consider them in our
analysis. On the other hand, due to questionnaire limitation, the study’s sample size is 1. This size
may be considered large for our statistical analysis.
Originality/value:  The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  to  propose  a  model  for  non-
cooperation among a number of  divisions in an organization and using risk management factors. 
Keywords: coalitional game theory, incompatible parts, risk management, security
1. Introduction and Literature Review
Today, the organizations and systems have been in an environment full of  challenge and transformation.
So, in this dynamic environment, organizations are needed to pace with environmental changes and make
a good decision. When deciding must be considered probability Risks that can have effect on decision
results, these areas discussed in the risk management. Decisions in the field of  risk management need to
consider risk management rules and procedures. 
Chai, Kim and Raghav-Rao (2011), stated that in the information society, it is important for firms to
manage  their  core  information  resources  securely.  Managers  to  achieve  this  objectives  should  be
emphasized on the information security, break the security boundaries defined for organization and all
the factors threaten encompass the information. In addition, the costs of  implementing an efficient
security policy are important. So, a comprehensive plan and strategy is needed that dealing with all cases
threat.  Arshad,  Mohamed  and  Mansor  (2009),  showed  that  the  organizational  structure  and  risk
management strategies, organization strategies, technology and knowledge organization are placed in a
row.  Therefore,  a  mechanism  to  create  a  strategic  risk  management  technique  in  project  risk
management and control system information is needed. Moreover, risk management techniques, risk,
uncertainty, and mistakes can potentially be acknowledged and immediately be dealt with rather than
ignore it and hid.
Workman (2007), demonstrated that there are many threats to the integrity, confidentiality, and availability
of  information maintained by organizational  systems.  Key issues related to internal  threats  have for
information security: nature and honesty in corporate and cultural factors, social and economic changes
considered  and  stating  that  the  security  risk  for  legal  access  to  facilities,  information,  knowledge
organization and location of  assets, should be considered to reduce the threats, therefor methods of
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prevention are better from methods of  reactive. Colwill  (2009), reported that in some cases internal
security breach can be caused by human error. 
Dlamini, Eloff  and Eloff  (2009), stated that information security vulnerabilities and associated problems
have costly ramifications. It is therefore critical that securing information and infrastructures should not
be considered in fear of  inevitable attacks, but in preparation for the uncertain future. Gordon, Loeb and
Tseng (2009) demonstrated that effects of  proper risk management life cycle impact on the organization
such as increasing efficiency and effectiveness, reduce costs, identify threats to the system and so on.
Yildirim, Akalp, Aytac and Bayram (2010), showed that for information security in small and medium
companies, factors such as security, environmental, physical, organizational and personnel were asked to
consider and stated that these parameters need to improve communications and operations management
and security policies to be better.
Awareness of  the risks in their organizations is growing  and organizations must learn how to manage
security risk. Today, risk management is a component of  a strong program of  information security in an
organization. Risk management in this area is faced with the opportunities and challenges in research. In
recent years, the study of  the risk management framework has been little analytical. 
a) Related work on the security risk management
Threat trees and attack trees are graphical notations that have evolved from fault trees,  Howard and
LeBlanc (2002) using threat trees and  Schechter (2004)  applying attack trees illustrated attackers’ goals
together with possible ways to reach these goals.. The attacker’s main goal is depicted as the root of  the
tree and the steps to reach this goal are broken down into sub-goals of  the attack through ‘‘AND’’ and
‘‘OR’’ relationships. Threat trees and attack trees have been applied in several ways to assess security.
Howard and LeBlanc (2002) suggested that the threat trees should be used to rank the threats is terms of
risk. Karabacak and Sogukpinar (2005) showed that Information Security Risk Analysis Method (ISRAM)
in a similar way guide the analyst to assess probabilities for security incidents to occur and to assess the
potential consequences of  these. Alberts and Dorofee (2001) stated that the same type of  guidance is also
provided by Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE). Architectural
models provide decision makers with a convenient tool to abstract and capture different aspects  of
information systems in diagrammatic descriptions. Hogganvik (2007) stated that meta-models like the one
offered in CORAS guide the modeler to create graphical descriptions that can be used to assess risk. This
type of  meta-models does however not help the modeler to identify the risks which their particular
architecture face, and do not provide the data needed to quantify security or risk based on the model.
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Hogganvik (2007) showed that CORAS is a method specifically developed for analyzing and quantifying
risk.. With guidance from CORAS’s meta-model, a graphical description of  the threat scenario is created
and used as a support to determine if, and how, the identified risks should be treated. This is done by
modeling the relationships between assets, threats, vulnerabilities, unwanted events, risks and treatments.
Although risk in CORAS is defined as the product of  likelihood and consequence, there is no analysis
framework coupled to the meta-model and thus no algorithmic method to calculate risk based on a
graphical description. There is also no description of  what different types of  risk treatments that should
be modeled, or how risk treatments influence risks in CORAS.
These calculations,  as  well  as  the content of  the CORAS diagram, must instead be assessed by the
persons applying CORAS. 
b) Using Game theory in Information Security
Morris  (1994)  stated  that  game  theory  has  been  successfully  applied  to  many  disciplines  including
economics, political science, and computer science. Game theory usually considers a multiplayer decision
problem where multiple  players  with different objectives  can compete  and interact  with each other.
Golany, Kaplan, Marmur and Rothblum (2009), Hausken and Levitin (2009)and Liu, Wang and Camp
(2008) reported that since 2001, game theory has been used as a promising scientific technique to deal
with security issues. Alpcan and Basar (2004), authors presented a game-theoretic analysis of  intrusion
detection in access control systems. In order to establish a quantitative mathematical framework, they
modeled the interaction between the attackers. The interaction between the attacker and the IDS was
formulated as a non-cooperative non-zero sum game with the virtual sensor network as a third fictitious
player. 
Liu and Zang (2005), the authors proposed a game theoretic approach for estimating the attacker’s intent,
objective,  and strategies  (AIOS).  They developed a game theoretic  AIOS formalization which could
capture the inherent interdependency between AIOS and defender objectives and strategies in a way that
AIOS  could  be  automatically  inferred.  Lima,  Contreras  and  Feltrin  (2008),  have  an  analysis  and
discussion, based on cooperative game theory, for the allocation of  the cost of  losses to generators and
demands in transmission systems. They construct a cooperative game theory model in which the players
are represented by equivalent bilateral exchanges and we search for a unique loss allocation solution, the
Core. Kantzavelou and Katsikas (2009) showed that notice to employees within the organization can at
any time to threaten the organization system. From game theory to model the interaction of  people
within the organization used if  that were to play in intrusion detection systems periodically is played
frequently. Using games to determine how an insider in the future will interact and how an intrusion
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detection system to protect the system reacts. Chatzoglou and Diamantidis (2009) on the effects of  non-
financial risks have discussed information technology and risks to be measured six variables are divided
into operations that include the user, managing and to measure company performance, productivity and
collaboration capabilities of  information were considered. 
Saad, Alpcan, Basar and Hjørungnes (2010), is worked on the this issue that the coalition formed to
increase utility in the organization, but given that the organizations work for reasons such as lack of
appropriate sections or enlarge the size of  a sector when the coalition together make up, and coordination
problems  in  these  sectors  cannot  people  with  exposure  to  the  desirability  of  a  group  seem  and
partnerships may not benefit  the organization,  studying the literature indicates the lack of  detection
sections is incompatible with the organization. 
This paper is organized as follows. We first present the proposed methodology of  our research in section
3. Section 4 explains the details validation and section 5 explains limitations on our work and finally
section 6 summarizes the contribution of  the paper.
2. The Proposed Framework
The main contribution of  this paper is to propose a model for non-cooperation among a number of
divisions in an organization and using risk management factors. We propose a model based on coalition
game theory and aspect of  non-cooperation in a coalition formation in a risk management. The proposed
model of  this paper, organization parts were considered as players and recognize incompatible divisions
in the organization. These incompatible divisions reduce the utility of  organization and consequently the
risk in the organization is increase. No work seems to have investigated how a number of  organizations
or  divisions  in  an  organization  can  not  cooperate  in  order  to  increase  their  vulnerabilities,  and,
consequently, increase their security risks.
Then under conditions of  non-cooperation incompatible parts, we want to achieve high levels of  risk
reduction benefits that, in fact, it is the main contribution of  this paper. In this way we are introduced two
theories, and using these theories are identified incompatible parts, to use this theories should determine
positive impact and negative impact and difference matrices. Finally, we implement the proposed model
of  this paper by analyzing the data which have been provided by questionnaires from different three
managers’  ideas  of  Iran  University  of  Science  and  Technology E-Learning Center  located  in  Iran
University of  Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran. 
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a) The Parameters and the Variables of  the Model
Suppose an organization has a part (player), that are Shown with the i, for i = 1, 2, …, n, let us define the
parameters and the variables of  the model as:
Parameter Description
Si security resources, including budgets, investments, human and professional staff
ti threatening each section
Pij a n*n positive impact matrix
Nij a n*n negative impact matrix
v({i}) utility of  division i
Cost( Q , C ) a n*n cost matrix
D a n*n difference matrix
Table 1. Parameters used
The communications between divisions in an organization have two forms:
1. Positive Communications: The communications that divisions have a positive effect on together.
Show that with the matrix Pij.
2. Negative Communications: The communications that divisions have a negative effect on together.
Show that with the matrix Nij.
(1)
(2)
The values of  ζij and λij are between zero and one.
Utility of  divisions in the organization for any division i which it tries to maximize, is calculated in this
way:
(3)
That, s: = [s1, s2, …, sn] be the vector of  security resources of  all divisions for defend against security risks
and t: = [t1, t2, …, tn] be the vector of  threats against vulnerabilities.
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Miura-Ko, Yolken, Mitchell and Bambos (2008) proposed the linear influence model uses a matrix to
represent linear dependence between resources at organization and threats at selfsame organization, and
utility functions to measure the benefit to organization.
b) The Proposed Protocol
With this model, which can form parts in a larger group, indicating they are incompatible and reducing
the utility in the organization. When the parts are placed in a group, matrices previously introduced,
definitely get the new value. These matrices is more clearly described below:
(4)
For simplicity in writing:
(5)
For simplicity in writing: 
These incompatible divisions have the difference and difference show with the following matrix:
(6)
Incompatible parts placed in a group to create a cost. In addition, coalition created each increase in the
size |C| also provides a cost. These costs are calculated as follows:
(7)
The parameters α ≥ 0 and β ≥ 0 quantify the price of  forming a coalition with |C| > 1 per unit friction
and per unit size, respectively.  Myerson (1991) proposed that characteristic function for utility in game
theory terms of  any coalition C will be given by:
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(8)
That 
(9)
(10)
While  N,  P,  D was considered as independent variables, utility  of  organization served as dependent
variables.  The  proposed  problem can be  modeled  as  a  coalitional  game with  the  players  being  the
divisions and the function given by (8).
The following theory states necessary and sufficient condition for not merging the two coalitions that is
incompatible coalition.
Theory 1: Consider two disjoint coalitions  , if  the two are merged , we
have in the case non-ideal:
v(C1  C2) ≤ v(C1) + v(C2) (11)
If  and only if  the following conditions on the cost function is established:
(12)
And
(13)
is the total loss of  this merger for the organization.
Proof:
Consider , , coalition value  is:
Using f  and g defined above we have:
Also have for coalition :
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and for coalition :
Replacing the equations relating v(C1  C2) ≤ v(C1) + v(C2). Necessary and sufficient condition for the
theory comes from.
Theory 2: consider  non-ideal working environment, Coalition   Should not be created if  and
only if
(14)
Where
(15)
is general differences between members , .
Proof: Cost function for :
with this definition:
This theory show lower bound on the cost per unit where cooperation for two coalition losses, in fact
show these divisions are incompatible. This means that when forming coalitions the lowest  α among α
with positive values are chosen, because that α show coalitions that less distance to bring the organization
to less utility and the role of  these incompatible sectors are more bold.
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3. Validation
It is always interesting to validate the results of  the implementation of  our proposed model on the real-
world case study of  this paper.
a) About the Case Study Organization
The center has three important information parts:
1. Education
2. Finance Section
3. Technology Department
Education in fact is considered very important and Main and all the information needed both financial
and IT sector  provides.  The financial  sector  using  of  information of  education sector  is  calculated
student semester fees and the IT sector using Information taken from the education sector put courses
for student in related page for student.
The first pre-processing of  the necessary research been done and then do a little building was desired. To
reach this goal the preparation of  questionnaires, each of  the managers based on their experiences of
their comments were announced.
For the given case study, the set of  all players is the set of  all divisions, i.e., n = {1, 2, 3}.
These three sector have vectors security sources s: = [10, 5, 7], and, Vector threats against vulnerabilities
t: = [18, 3, 5]
Matrices of  positive and negative impact on another sector organization using a questionnaire  were
obtained as follows:
(16)
(17)
To initialize in the differences matrix, we use Licert’s 5-degree spectrum and if  between sections was not
the different, puts Zero.
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Very high High Average Low Very low
2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5
Table 2. Likert’s 5-degree spectrum 
So the difference matrix is calculated as follows:
(18)
Considering we have β = 1, try with data obtained to specify incompatible divisions that minimizes the
total utility of  organization as the price per unit friction α varies.
Coalition 1 and 2:
Coalition 1 and 3:
Coalition 2 and 3:
Considering that the amount of  α cannot be negative, so the coalition that should be discussed , first and
third.
Initial utility for organization is each value, utility formed this coalition is equal to -34. Then total utility
organization formed from incompatible divisions becomes less.
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4. Limitation
Since Information security and also Risk Management are still areas which need to improve in some
Iranian  universities,  we  couldn’t  consider  them  in  our  analysis.  On  the  other  hand,  due  to
questionnaire  limitation,  the  study’s  sample  size  is  1.  This  size  may  be  considered  large  for  our
statistical analysis.
5. Conclusion 
In this research we prepare a questionnaire to evaluate Incompatible parts and also risk management in
University of  Science and Technology E-Learning Center and studying the Incompatible parts impacts
on utility of  organization. In general,  by collecting data and analyzing them, the survey showed that
Incompatible parts of  organizations have negative impacts on utility of  organization risk management
process. Furthermore, it adds values to other organizations and provides the best practices in planning,
developing, implementing and monitoring risk management in organizations.
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